The illustration above was created by AI, and does not represent the actual FEC Commissioners. AI “is not perfect” even if you give it express directions.

Allen Dickerson resigned as a Commissioner of the Federal Election Commission on Wednesday, April 30, 2025, the end of his four-year term in office. As is customary, he offered a statement of thanks and his thoughts on his time on the FEC (under controlling judicial interpretations, FEC Commissioners have to issue statements of their thinking on a variety of questions that come before the Commission, so they’re used to thinking in public). As usual for Dickerson, his statement contained concise and insightful analyses of the recent history and troubles of the FEC, as well as its purpose and the hydraulic pressures to misuse the power to limit political speech.

Some excerpts:

It is difficult to remember the Commission we inherited in 2020. Years of entrenchment and recrimination had badly hobbled this organization. The enforcement backlog numbered in the hundreds of matters, many imperiled by the statute of limitations. Regulatory efforts had lain dormant for a decade or longer. The FEC was refusing to show up in Federal court, or even explain why. Meanwhile, basic efforts to acknowledge binding decisions of the Supreme Court went nowhere as long serving commissioners played a delaying game rather than accept judicial losses. The commissioners had such difficulty agreeing on advisory opinions that the public largely stopped asking.

I mention all of this for three reasons.

First, to celebrate. The four of us serving today undertook quietly successful reforms that make 2020 feel like a distant memory. Under Commissioner Broussard’s leadership, we cleared the enforcement backlog. Together, we passed a regulation that had been repeatedly debated, and repeatedly shelved, for thirteen years. And then we passed another. The Commission started showing up in court, both to enforce
and to defend. We turned our back on procedural gamesmanship, for the most part, and accepted public scrutiny and the fully-informed judgment of the judiciary. And while I fervently wish we had gone further, we took steps in the direction of good government and regular order: reforming our investigation procedures, collaborating with the State Department, and updating our forms. The list goes on.

Second, to warn. The FEC’s mission is extraordinarily delicate. We regulate, and limit, political participation – a constitutionally dicey proposition made worse by muddled, highly-technical rules. And we do it against an explicitly political backdrop.

There is great temptation to take procedural shortcuts for short-term gain, or to believe the stakes are so high in this election – it is always this election – that they justify departures from principle, or tempt us to the more insidious errors that come from viewing the law through partisan lenses.

The Commission we inherited did not fall apart overnight, and the Commission we have built is not guaranteed to last. In a dark chapter, I remember asking one of our former colleagues: why? What was the justification for defaulting a federal agency, hiding our votes, leaving everyone – including the parties before us – in the dark and on the hook?

The answer came back: “because I’m tired of losing.”

However well intentioned, that is the answer of the tyrant and the Star Chamber. It reflects a blinkered and self-aggrandizing view of this Commission’s role and our individual importance. It cannot be permitted to establish itself here again.

…

Let me leave you with two thoughts that have guided my view of the Commission’s enforcement role.

Some of you may believe the problem is that the Commission deadlocks too often and enforces too seldom. I urge you to remember that the sincere bipartisan nature of our enforcement decisions is why, when the Commission does move forward, it does so credibly. Congress wisely created an agency that fails safe. There is no shortcut. The American people will not accept partisan enforcement of political rules, whether under the guise of “good government” litigation, or supposedly “nonpartisan” experts. Persuasion, not gamesmanship, is the only practical way forward.

Some of you may believe the problem is overenforcement, that the Commission itself is unconstitutional and that the Republic would be better off if it failed. I urge you to remember that the original sin of campaign finance regulation is not overbreadth, but vagueness. Sincere bipartisan interpretation of the rules, and a one-stop-shop for answers, is a powerful tool protecting political participation. This is why an evenly divided commission, led by a chair and vice chair elected in an orderly rotation between the parties, is crucial. There is no shortcut here either.